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STUDENT NOTES
HEARINGS AND REHEARINGS IN BANC IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS.'-Cases before nine of the eleven courts of
appeals2 are ordinarily not considered by all the judges thereof.
Rather, generally, hearings take place before and decisions are
rendered by a three-judge panel or division of the full court.5 To
a consideration of these alternatives, divisional or full court, this
note is addressed: first, to examining the question of power-might
I After research was substantially completed, a Note on the subject appeared
in another legal periodical, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1954). The writer of
this note gratefully acknowledges the help derived therefrom in supplementing
his own research.
2 In the first and fourth circuits, the full court decides all cases. Each has
but three judges. Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February
16, 1954, from Mr. Roger A. Stinchfield, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit; letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February
12, 1954, from Mr. Claude M. Dean, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
3A full court consists of three judges in the first circuit, six in the second,
seven in the third, three in the fourth, six in the fifth, six in the sixth, seven
in the eighth, seven in the ninth, five in the tenth, and nine in the District
of Columbia circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1952). Pub. L. No. 294, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (Feb. 10, 1954) authorized an increase in the number of judges in the
fifth circuit to seven and in the ninth circuit to nine.
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a court of appeals consisting of more than three judges legally
sit as a full court-and its solution; second, to the procedures
adopted by the circuits for shifting a hearing or rehearing of a
case from a division to the full court; third, to the criteria used by
the circuits in determining whether a particular case should be
considered by a full court; fourth, to the frequency of an in banc
sitting in the several circuits; and fifth, to an evaluation of the
procedures in the circuits in the light of the indicia set forth in
the Supreme Court opinions in Western Pacific R.R. v. Western
Pacific R.R.
4
The federal courts of appeals-, were established in 1891.6 The
act establishing these courts provided in Section 2 that each court
shall consist of three judges. The three-judge provision of the
act of 1891 was carried over into section 117 of the Judicial Code
of 1911.7 Read in conjunction with section 118, this gave rise to
a manifest inconsistency inasmuch as the latter section provided
that four circuits should have four judges each.
With the passing of years, more judges were allotted to cope
with the increasing work of various circuits. Some courts came to
consist of two divisions and thus the possibility arose that one
division mght decide a case at odds with a previous decision by
another division of the same circuit. Besides inter-circuit conflict,
there thus existed a probability that intra-circuit conflicts would
emerge. Should one division feel constrained to reach a diametrical-
ly opposite conclusion from that of a sister division, the question
would arise, can the likelihood of opposite holdings in the same
circuit be combatted by presenting the issue to a court comprised
of all the judges assigned to the circuit? There was room for real
doubt for as has been noted, section 117 of the Judicial Code said
that each court of appeals shall consist of three judges. In the
light of this section, could a court be composed of more than
three judges? For example, could it consist of seven judges sitting
together, which is the present number assigned to the eighth
circuit?
Power.-In 1938, two judges on a division of the ninth circuit
were unable to agree with an earlier decision s of a division of that
4 845 U.S. 247 (1953).
G In the revision of title 28 of the United States Code, enacted by Congress
in June 1948 the term "Court of Appeals" was substituted for the term
"Circuit Court of Appeals."
0 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
7 36 STAT. 1131 (1911).
8 Bank of Amerca v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.
1937).
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court and the issue was first presented for formal decision whether
diversity of view could be brought before all of the judges of the
court, sitting in banc, for resolution. The ninth circuit opined
that in view of the express language of section 117 there was no
way for a circuit consisting of more than three judges to assemble
itself in banc.9
Two years later the court of appeals for the third circuit came
to a different conclusion. Reading section 117 and section 118
together, the court, in Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Textile
Mills Securities Corp.,'0 held that it did have power to provide for
sessions in banc, consisting of all the circuit judges in active service.
To resolve the disagreement between circuits the Supreme
Court granted certiorari- in the Textile Mills case and on the
in banc issue sustained the third circuit.12 Declaring that section
118 of the Judicial Code was not to be defeated by section 117, a
result which would on all matters disenfranchise some circuit
judges against the clear intendment of section 11813 although
conceding that it might be subordinating literalness to common
sense in construing the two sections, the Court reasoned that
".... The result reached makes for more effective judicial ad-
ministration. Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided.
Finality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal will be
promoted. Those considerations are especially important in
view of the fact that in our federal judicial system these
courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary
cases. Such considerations are, of course, not for us to weigh
in case Congress has devised a system where the judges of a
court are prohibited from sitting en banc. But where, as here,
the case on the statute is not forecloscd, they aid in tipping
the scales in favor of the more practicable interpretation.1
4
And so it was settled that a court of appeals did have power
to shift the hearing of a case from a division to the full court
sitting in banc.
Congress in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code of 1911
expressly adopted the approval of in banc sittings, in title 28 of
9 Lang's Estate v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1988).
The diversity of views between the Bank of America and the Lang case was
therefore certified to the Supreme Court and resolved in accordance with the
opinion of that Court. The Court gave no opinion on the in banc issue.
Lang's Estate v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 804 U.S. 264 (1988).
10 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940).
"8 312 U.S. 677 (1941).
2314 U.S. 826 (1941).
13 Id. at 383.
'4 Id. at 834-5.
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the United States Code,15 while providing also for the continuance
of divisional determination. The statute now reads:
"Gases and controversies shall be heard and determined
by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless
a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered
by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in
active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active
circuit judges of the circuit."
Nothing is said regarding at whose instance who may initiate such
action or by what procedure in banc considerations will be made
available. Those were the next problems which demanded reso-
lution.
Procedure.-In 1952, in Western'Pacific R.R. v. Western Pacific
R.R.,26 the Court of Appeals was confronted with the question
whether, by virtue of Section 46 (c), a losing party is entitled as of
right to have its petition for rehearing in banc considered and
ruled upon by the full court. The court, assembled in banc, held
that the party had no such right, that
"A petition for rehearing in any such case, whatever its
form or wording, must necessarily be treated as addressed to
and is solely for disposition by the court or division to which
the case was assigned for determination. If the court so con-
stituted, or a majority of its members, denies the petition,
that ends the matter so far as concerns the Court of Appeals."'1
The court's objection to having a petition for a rehearing in
banc ruled upon by all active judges was that such "would render
merely tentative or provisional the decisions of the court in 98
per cent or more of the cases that come before it.""'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' both on the merits
and on the in banc issue. Remanding on the in banc question, the
Court after extensive discussion concluded that litigants are given
no statutory right to compel each member of the court to give
formal consideration to an application for a rehearing in banc,
that the statute does not compel the courts to adopt any particular
procedure governing the exercise of the power, but that, whatever
the procedure adopted, it should be clearly explained, so that the
members of the court and litigants may become thoroughly familiar
with it.20 The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its "general power
15 28 U.S.C. § 46c (Supp. 1952).
10 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1952).
17 Id. at 1015.
18 Ibid.
19 344 U.S. 809 (1952).
20 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
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to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,"21
set forth indicia to be observed by the courts of appeals in formu-
lating procedures for exercising the in banc power. These will
be considered later.
What practices have the courts of appeal actually adopted or
announced in this connection?
In the first circuit, where there are but three active judges, no
occasion has arisen for in banc procedure.
22
The court of appeals of the second circuit has never assembled
in banc2 3 and has no established policy regarding such action, but
no rule of that court prohibits such hearings and the court recog-
nizes that it could sit in banc of its own motion.
24
The third circuit, the pioneer in developing a procedure for in
banc hearings, has in the thirteen years since it first sat in banc25
achieved the formulation of a procedure which according to the
judges of the circuit has proved entirely satisfactory. 20 For clarity,
the procedure for shifting a hearing or rehearing of a case from a
division to the full court has been classified into two headings:
hearing in banc and rehearing in banc. Under each, provisions for
litigant and sua sponte inception of suggestions for the shift are
set forth, followed by the procedure for disposing of the proposals.
The litigants may request that the original hearing of a case be
in banc but such requests are rarely made; a request does not have
the force of an order that the hearing be in banc. For sua sponte
inception before assignment to panel. no special provision is made
although occasionally an in banc hearing is ordered, before assign-
ment. This is rare. Normally the judges have no knowledge of the
nature of the cases pending until after they have been listed for
argument before a panel of the court and briefs furnished to the
judges of the panel. After assignment to a panel, when the three
judges have read the briefs before argument, they occasionally
21 Id. at 260, citing United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 584
(1948).
22 Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated Feb. 16, 1954, from Mr.
Roger A. Stinchfield, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
23 In In Re Sacher, 206 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 218
(1953), judge Clark dissenting noted that he had requested the Chief judge
to poll the court in an effort to bring the matter before the court in banc.
The judges declined to sit in banc by a vote of three to two. Note, 22 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 482 (1954).
24 Letter to the George Washington Law Review, dated November 23, 195,3,
from Alexander M. Bell, Clerk United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Note, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 482 (1954).
25 Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 117 F.2d
62 (3d Cir. 1940).
28 Mars, Hearing nad Rehearing Cases in Banc. The Procedure of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 14 F.R.D. 91 (1953).
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feel that the case ought probably to be originally heard in banc
whereupon they consult with the other four. Hearing in banc is
ordered only with the concurrence of at least four of the seven
circuit judges of the circuit and always if four judges so request.
As to rehearing in banc, there is no particular procedure for
litigant inception before decision of the panel. After argument,
the judge to whom the opinion is assigned prepares for the panel
a draft opinion which is circulated by letter to other members of
the panel and also to the judges not on the panel, the latter being
requested merely to inform the opinion writer whether in their view
the case should be reargued in banc. Normally an order for re-
hearing in banc after decision by a panel results from a petition
for rehearing filed by the losing party. When a petition for re-
hearing after the panel decision is filed, the clerk transmits a copy
to each of the circuit judges with a letter request to each to inform
the judge who filed the opinion of the court whether he thinks
the petition should be granted. It is the duty of each judge to
answer either yes or no or any of the four judges not on the panel
may answer that he is content to leave the disposition of the
petition to the judges of the panel which heard and decided the
case originally. An order for rehearing in banc after decision by a
panel results only occasionally without a litigant petition at the
instance of four or more judges of the court. No procedure is
stated for sua sponte inception; apparently if any judge can obtain
the concurrence of three of his brethren, the case will be reheard in
banc. The question of rehearing in banc, as of a hearing in banc,
is decided only by the votes of at least four circuit judges. While
the panel which heard and decided the case originally or any one
of concurring judges may direct a rehearing before the same panel,
it is beyond the power of the panel, under the statute as the court
construes it, to direct a rehearing in banc unless at least one other
circuit judge, making a total of four in all, concurs in the order
for such rehearing. There is an exception apparently when the
four circuit judges leave the petition of the litigant for a rehearing
in banc to the disposition of the panel. A rehearing in banc will
be ordered if the four nonparticipating circuit judges so vote upon
their individual consideration of the petition for rehearing sub-
mitted to them by the clerk even though all three judges of the
panel which heard and decided the case vote against such re-
hearing.
27
27 Maris, supra note 26.
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There are but three judges assigned to the fourth circuit and
in cases before this court all three sit.28
The fifth circuit has no formal rules on in banc hearings and
rehearings but the following informal procedure has obtained.29
If any judge of the court thinks a case should be considered in banc
he discusses it with the Chief Judge who, if he agrees 0 that such
procedure is merited, speaks or writes informally to the other
judges asking their views as to whether the full court should hear
the case. When a total of four members feel such a hearing is
desirable, an order is entered setting the case for in banc hearing
before the full court, otherwise the matter is dropped without
order of any kind.31
In the sixth circuit there is no established procedure governing
in banc hearings32 or rehearings. But one case has been heard in
banc, the court there sitting in banc upon its own motion.83
The seventh circuit has no rule regarding hearing or rehearing
of cases in banc. There has been no in banc hearing or rehearing
and no application for a full court sitting.84
While the rules of the eighth circuit do not so provide, in
practice the parties may by motion, either separate or joint, request
that the court grant a hearing in banc. Rule 15 (e) of the circuit
states:
"The division of. the Court by which a case has been
heard and determined shall have the power to finally dispose
of any petition for the rehearing of the case and of any
request for consideration thereof by the Court in banc."
Rule 23 of the ninth circuit provides:
28 Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February 12, 1954, from
Mr. Claude M. Dean, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
29 Letter to the George Washington Law Review, dated November 24, 1953,
from Oakley F. Dodd, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in which Mr. Dodd quotes from the correspondence of Chief Judge
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. Note, 22 Go. WAsH. L. R v. 482 (1954).
s "Without the support of the Chief judge, it would be futile for a single
dissenting judge to press his argument further, for the alliance of the Chief
judge with the other judges from the division makes a vote for en bane action by
the ajority of circuit judges impossible in the six man court. See, however, Pub.
L. NO. 294, 83rd Cong. ist Sess. (Feb. 10, 1954) which increases the number of
judges in the Fifth Circuit from six to seven." Note, 22 GEO. WAsH. L. Ray. 482,
486 (1954).
31l1d, at 482, based upon footnote 29 supra.
32 Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1943) (involved the death
penalty for treason).
33Letter to West Virginia Law Review, dated February 12, 1954, from Mr.
Carl W. Reuss, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
3 'Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February 17, 1954, from
Mr. Kenneth J. Carrick, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
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"All petitions for rehearing shall be addressed to and be
determined by the court as constituted in the original hearing.
"Should a majority of the court as so constituted grant a
rehearing and either from a suggestion of a party or upon its
own motion be of the opinion that the case should be reheard
en bane, they shall so inform the Chief Judge. The Chief
Judge shall thereupon convene the active judges of the court
and the court shall thereupon determine whether the case
shall be reheard en banc".
Apparently the court has no procedure relative to the original
hearing of a case in banc.
Rule 20 of the tenth circuit provides:
"A hearing of a case or controversy shall be had only
when ordered by a majority of the Judges of the Circuit who
are in active service. Applications for hearing en bane will
be considered by all of the Judges of the Circuit who are in
active service. A majority of such Judges may order a hear-
ing en banc sua sponte. This rule shall also apply to rehear-
ing en banc".
The District of Columbia court of appeals provides for either
litigant or sua sponte inception of an in banc hearing. The litigants
may by written motion or petition request that the original hearing
or a rehearing be in banc, the motion or petition being submitted
to and ruled upon by all active circuit judges of the circuit. Any
judge or any division of the court may request an in banc pro-
ceeding by memorandum addressed to all the active circuit judges
which indicates why a case should be so heard or reheard and
requests the judges to notify the chief judge of their vote on the
request. If a majority are favorable, an order is entered and the
case scheduled for in banc hearing or rehearing. The practice of
the judges of this court is to furnish drafts of opinions in all cases
to the non-sitting judges, for information, before filing. The latter,
as well as the judges constituting the division which heard the
case, may request and vote on a rehearing in banc, either before as
well as after the decision is rendered.
"'
Criteria.-What, if any, criteria have evolved in the circuits
for determining whether a particular case should be heard or
reheard in banc?
The second circuit has never convened in banc. "
15 A Statement, dated November 18, 1952, prepared by Mr. Joseph W.
Stewart, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, with Respect to the Matter of Hearings In Banc and Re-
hearings In Banc in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
'6 See note 24 suPra.
8
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It is impossible to discover any definite criteria applied in the
third circuit since the judges in voting on an application for an
in banc sitting are not required to give reasons for their votes.
Guiding considerations, however, appear to include the importance
and difficulty of the problem presented, divergencies in the tenta-
tive views of the judges, and the raising of serious questions as to
the correctness of an earlier decision of the court. Of the six cases
heard in banc during the term beginning in October, 1951, one
involved the construction of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54 (b),87
one the availability of mandamus to review the refusal of a district
judge to transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a), 38 two the con-
struction of the federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 39 and two an income
tax point on which district courts in the circuit disagreed (both
the hearing panel and the court in banc being similarly divided in
opinion).
40
In the fifth circuit, the only criterion stated is "exceptional
circumstances. "41
The sixth circuit has heard but one case 42 in banc. That
involved the death penalty for treason.
43
The in banc procedure has never been used in the seventh
circuit.
44
The rules of the court in the eighth circuit do not specify the
criteria used or to be used by the court in determining whether a
particular case should be heard or reheard in banc.
4 5
In the ninth circuit, no definite criteria have been formulated
by which to determine what cases are appropriate for in banc
consideration. However, cases of extraordinary public importance
or those involving constitutional questions seem to be so regarded. 4"
No information from the tenth circuit is available as to the
existence of any criteria.
37 Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952).
38 All State Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952); section
1404a was a new statute in United States Code, a codification of forum non
conveniens doctrine.
39 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Supp. 1952).
40 See note 26 supra.
41 See note 29 supra; cf. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 74
Sup. Ct. 574 (1954).
42 Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1943).
43 See note 33 supra.
44 See note 34 supra.
45 Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February 12, 1954, from
Mr. E. E. Koch, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
46 197 F.2d 994, 1014 n.4 (1952).
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In the District of Columbia circuit, there has been hearing or
rehearing in banc in three classes of cases 47-those involving a
question whether a division of the court should be overruled"4
those involving a question as to the power of the court,49 and those
involving a question of extraordinary public importance. 50
Frequency.-The second circuit has never sat in banc.5 1 In the
third circuit sessions in banc take place only occasionally. The
number of cases heard or reheard in banc during the term of court
beginning in October, 1951 was only six, out of the total of 239
cases heard.5 2 In the fifth circuit the court seldom sits in banc more
than once or twice a year.53 The court of appeals of the sixth
circuit sat in banc once54 and that of the seventh circuit never.55
A full court hearing has been "seldom granted" in the eighth
circuit.50 From 1941 until 1952 approximately thirty cases were
heard in banc in the ninth circuit. Nineteen, or about two-thirds,
were assigned to the court in banc at the time they were originally
calendared. Rather more than half of the nineteen seem to have
been cases of great public importance, for example, those during
the war arising out of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
the institution of martial law in Hawaii, the removal of Japanese
from Pacific coast states, and contempt proceedings involving
claimed violations of the constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination.57 The court of appeals in the tenth circuit seldom
sits as a full court.58 In the District of Columbia circuit the power
to grant in banc hearings has been sparingly exercised. It is not
47Remarks of Chief Judge Harold M. Stephens, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, at the District of Columbia Bar
Ass'n Meeting, Nov. 12, 1952, 20 J. OF BAR Ass'N OF Disruar OF COLUMBIA
103, 107 (1953).
48 Citizens Bank v. District of Columbia, 195 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Columbia National Bank v. District of Columbia, 195 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir.
1952); In the Matter of John W. Carter, 192 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1951); cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 86$ (4951); Kephart v. Kephart, 193 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Overholser v. Boddie, '184 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1950).49Scripps-Howard v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951).
S0Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 192 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952), in-
volving the power of the President to seize an industrial enterprise, sub nom.,
District of Columbia v. Catholic Education Press, 199 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
involving a question as to tax exemption.
5'1 See note 24 supra.
52 See note 26 supra.
. See note 29 supra.
54 See note 33 supra.
sa See note 34 supra.
GeSee note 45 supra.
57 See note 46 supra.
as Letter to the West Virginia Law Review, dated February 16, 1954, from
Mr. Robert B. Cartwright, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.
10
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used to make the court in banc a general reviewing court for divi-
sional decisions. From September 1, 1948, when title 28 became
effective until March, 1953, petitions by litigants for hearing in
banc were three in number and all were denied. Of thirty-four
petitions by litigants for rehearings in banc, four were granted and
thirty denied. Three hearings in banc were ordered by the court
sua sponte, as were five rehearings in banc. 9
Circuits' conformance to Western Pacific requirements and
indica.-Analysis along the same lines of procedure for invoking,
locus of determination, criteria, and frequency is pertinent in
examining the impact of the Western Pacific opinions (as distinct
from the decision) as to what may or should be provided by the
circuits in formulating procedure and criteria for shifting the
hearing or rehearing of a case from a panel to the full court.
As to procedure, the opinion is explicit in admonishing the
circuits that litigants be enabled to suggest to whoever has the
function of according a rehearing in banc that a case is an ap-
propriate one for exercise of the power,60 while recognizing that
the court may properly initiate in banc hearings sua sponte.01
Section 46 (c) does not require each active judge assigned to a
circuit to give formal consideration to an application for a rehear-
ing in banc. 2 Whatever the procedure adopted, it should be
clearly defined so that the members of the court and litigants may
become thoroughly familiar with it.3
The opinion states that the court, consistently with the statute,
may formulate either a practice whereby a majority of the full
59 See note 47 supra.
60 845 U.S. 247, 267 (1953). The opinion continued: "... counsel's sug-
gestions need not require any formal action by the court; it need not be
treated as a motion; it is enough if the court simply gives each litigant an
opportunity to call attention to circumstances in a particular case which might
warrant a rehearing en banc." Justice Frankfurter, however, in his concurring
opinion at page 271 says that "[tjhe ends of § 46(c) may be served in other
ways than by permitting petitions for rehearing en banc. A court may decide
that it will act under § 46 (c) only sua sponte and will do so whenever the need
is made evident ....
611d. at 262. Justice Frankfurter at page 271 suggests that in sta sponte
initiation each panel circulate its opinions, before they are emitted, to all the
active members of the court. He points out that there may be other ways
of acting sua sponte but he can conceive of no procedure that will ac-
complish the purpose of the in bane power which does not apprise all active
judges either of all decisions of panels of the court, or of those decisions
which counsel bring to the court's attention, by motion or suggestion as raising
the problems at which the grant of power in section 46c is directed.
621d at 267. The concurring opinion at page 272 states that unless the
.court determines to act only sua sponte, the en banc power cannot achieve its
full purpose unless all judges are apprised of the decisions which counsel
bring to the court's attention as proper for an en banc consideration.
63 Id. at 267.
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bench determines whether there should be hearings or rehearings
in banc or one delegating to the division the responsibility for
passing on the appropriateness for exercise of the in banc power.64
Without proposing particular criteria, the opinion, in reiterat-
ing the view of the Textile Mills case that in banc power is a
necessary and useful one65 and in calling attention to cases68 whose
disposition illustrated the usefulness which it deemed the power
to have in the administration of justice in the courts of appeals,
seems to imply that they should not be unduly restrictive.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, is more specific, saying:
"Rehearings en banc by these courts, which sit in panels,
are to some extent necessary in order to resolve conflicts be-
tween panels. This is the dominant concern. Moreover, the
most constructive way of resolving conflicts is to avoid them.
Hence, insofar as possible, determinations en banc are indi-
cated whenever it seems likely that a majority of all the
active judges would reach a different result than the panel
assigned to hear a case or which has heard it. Hearings en
banc may be a resort also in cases extraordinary in scale-
either because the amount involved is stupendous or because
the issues are intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of
the circuit."""
As to frequency, the Court said that while the in banc power
may be used sparingly, the courts of appeals ought not curtail its
use indiscriminately. s
Comparing the majority with the concurring opinion, the
former stressed the necessity of permitting litigants to suggest proper
cases for rehearing in banc; the latter was willing to sanction pro-
64 Id. at 261. But the concurring opinion at page 272 reasons that "a
delegation of authority to the panel which heard the case to dispose finally, in
behalf of the entire court, of petitions for rehearing en banc-if there are to be
such petitions and if through them alone § 46(c) is to be implemented-
would [not] constitute adoption of a permissible procedure for the exercise
of the powers conferred by § 46(c). It may be prop er to require petitions
for rehearing en banc to be made to the panel in the first instance, but to
allow the discretionary function under § 46(c) to be discharged definitively by
the panel whose judgment may call for en banc action is to treat the statute
as an empty, purposeless form of words."
o Id. at 260.
66 United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649 (1942), and
Civil Aeronautics Board v. American Air Transport, 344 U.S. 4 (1952). In the
first case, a "conflict of views" had arisen "among the judges of the Ninth
Circuit" and the Supreme Court remanded the case "for further proceedings,
including leave to petitioner to apply for a hearing before the court en banc."
In the second case, a division of the court of appeals "were unable to agree on
a disposition of the case," and the Supreme Court dismissed the certificate with
the suggestion: "Perhaps the Court of Appeals may now wish to hear this
,case en banc to resolve the deadlock indicated in the certificate and give full
review to the entire case."
67 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953).
08 Id. at 261.
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cedures contemplating only sua sponte inception of an in banc
sitting. The former left it to each court to elect whether the
judges should all vote on in banc petitions or whether this should
be delegated to the division; the latter felt that only the first
course would serve the purposes of section 46 (c).
There is the utmost variety in the extent to which the circuits,
since the Western Pacific decision, exhibit conformity with the
views there expressed. The range extends from the third circuit's
elaborate procedure to the seventh circuit's utter absence of pro-
cedure for a complete nonuse of the in banc power. The second,
sixth, and seventh circuits, since they have no established pro-
cedures, of course, have none than can be "clearly explained" to
litigants. While these circuits do not prohibit such hearings, it
may be that they are curtailing the in banc power "indiscrimi-
nately." The eighth and ninth circuits, in providing for having
petitions of litigants for rehearing in banc ruled on by the division,
have chosen an option permissible under the majority but con-
demned by the concurring opinion. The third, tenth, and District
of Columbia circuits' established procedures seem fully to conform
to the Western Pacific opinion and afford to other circuits useful
though not identical patterns of how conformity may be achieved.
The feasibility of formulating criteria for application to all
cases coming before the court to determine whether there should
be an in banc sitting is doubtful."" The classes of cases in which
the District of Columbia circuit has used its in banc power is,
however, suggestive of those appropriate for consideration by full
court.
C.R.M.
LAW OF SAFETY DEPOSIT BoxEs.-The growth of safety deposit
business to its present commercial importance had its origin as an
incident of banking from its very beginning when the goldsmiths
of London received money, bullion and plate from depositors
merely for safe-keeping.' Though a body of law, separate from the
general law of banking, has developed concerning safe-deposit
boxes, the business of leasing depositories for the safe-keeping of
valuables is nearly always conducted by a bank or trust company
69 See Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada, 29 CAN. B. REV. 1038, 1043
(1951). The Supreme Court of Canada though it sits in division and in banc
has no established criteria to be applied to all cases to determine if a particular
one is proper for a full court hearing.
S1I ZoLLmAN, BANKS & BANKING 34 (Perm. ed. 1936).
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